What follows is (I hope) an interesting delineation of how my own position in ethical philosophy proceeds. It begins, as all philosophy should, with an examination of reason itself.
1. The first thing I discover is that reason appears to be seriously bifurcated into two modes: theoretical and practical. We find that people reason theoretically in order to decide what to believe, and that people reason practically in order to come to a decision about what to do.I sense that this is no illusion, that we are dealing with two very different modes of thought and inference, and so I begin to search for definitive ways to tease the two modes apart. It would be unwise to stick with what I already have. The perception that there are two modes does not in and of itself establish that there are two distinct modes.
Nor can I insist that the two modes are exclusive: for it is clear that in reasoning practically we must rely on a huge collection of true or justified beliefs. Conversely, practical considerations may sometimes creep into theoretical concerns, as in the case of parsimonious theory-choice, where we ultimately adjudicate between two competing sets of beliefs on the basis of convenience.
The first thing to be said in favour of the “two modes” hypothesis is that it helps to explain—indeed, it may be constitutive of—the so-called “is-ought gap”. Now, it may be that the is-ought problem is solvable, but it must be said that the problem itself is probably the most notorious in all of modern ethical philosophy. It also has to be said that the gap is tidily explained by the deep divide between practical and theoretical reason. Perhaps it is so difficult to derive an ought from an is because the sorts of things that make ought-statements true are not the sorts of things that make is-statements true. This is explained by the fact that each kind of statement arises from a different mode of reasoning. While more would need to be said in this regard, it seems clear that the is-ought gap is strong evidence for the existence of something like a theoretical/practical split within reason itself.
Continuing on, I must look for some central distinguishing fact that helps to separate the two modes of reasoning. The most significant, I believe, is the undeniable fact that judgments of practical reason can be true relative to individuals, while judgments of theoretical reason cannot.
“Relativism” is perhaps the most maligned doctrine in all of philosophy. This despite the fact that, to a significant extent, we are all relativists in the practical sphere. No sane person could deny that what I have reason to do is often powerfully conditioned by contingent psychological and physiological facts about me. I ought not to pursue Olympic Weightlifting. For Jim, my neighbour, pursuing Olympic weightlifting just might be a good idea. I am a thin and frail person with little to no tolerance for physical strain, and I have skills which can earn me money and respect in other arenas. Jim is a powerhouse of a young man who works at a menial desk job and who (to all appearances) could lift weights with the best of them. The same practical course of action: “I ought to pursue weightlifting”, is true for Jim and false for me, and this is so because of contingent facts about each of us. There is nothing left to say.
It is virtually definitive of the theoretical sphere that this cannot be the case. “There is a Cadillac in this room”, says one of our friends. Another denies it. The rules of theoretical reason allow for this disagreement but absolutely forbid that it be the final word. One of us is right and one of us is wrong, or we are simply using the relevant terms differently. The function of theoretical reason is to resolve factual disagreement, to allow differing parties to use tested, reliable means in order to come to some agreement on what is the case. Another way of putting this is to say that the truths of theoretical reason are, ideally, categorical: binding on all agents.
If no-one else sees the Cadillac, if metal detectors and infrared scanners detect no trace of it, and if our friend continues to insist that it is there, we do not excuse him on the basis of contingent physiological or psychological features that cause him to believe this. We do not continue to think that he is justified in his belief. Rather, we point to such features as flaws in his theoretical faculties! The contrast with practical reason is, at this point, extreme.
This, then, is a defining feature of the two modes of reasoning: practical reason admits of genuine relativism about its truths while theoretical reason admits of no such relativism.
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2. Now, importantly, we can reason theoretically about practical reason. Indeed, this is what philosophical ethicists do, as well as psychologists and sociologists who study our practical faculties. All of them are trying to come to justified or true beliefs about the practical sphere, be they philosophical or scientific truths.
The converse is equally true: we can reason practically about theoretical reason. We can ask, for example, if it would be good or expedient to believe one scientific theory over another.
We are now in a position to see that the traditional complaint about ethical relativism—that it is somehow self-refuting—is vacuous. It is charged that the statement “ethical truths are relative to the (individual/culture/historical epoch)” is itself a statement of absolute, unqualified truth and is thus self-refuting. Yet, this common complaint evaporates when we see that ethical relativism is actually a theoretical observation about practical matters. It is of course absolute and unqualified, as all final theoretical truths must be. Yet, it is about practical reason (or a sub-set of practical reason called “ethics”), and there is nothing self-contradictory about that.
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3. Philosophers thinking about practical reason are often divided by a foundational question: is there a subset of practical reason called “morality” which is entirely immune from the relativism which infects the rest of the practical realm? In more familiar terms, are moral propositions just those practical propositions which are categorical, in that their truth-values cannot vary from individual to individual?
The moral realist believes that they are, and he usually comes to this conclusion by drawing an analogy between practical and theoretical reason. A common device in the moral realist literature involves speaking of a “perceptive” faculty in practical reasoning, one which detects moral properties in objects just as our eyes detect their shape and color. Failure to be moved by the suffering of another is no different than a failure to see an onrushing Cadillac: one’s faculties are simply broken.
The Kantian objectivist takes a different route to the same conclusion. She affirms the autonomy of practical reason, denying that there are any interesting analogies between practical and theoretical reasoning. Yet, she maintains that the very structure of practical reason itself generates certain categorical obligations that are binding on all rational individuals. Practical reason is not wholly relativistic.
My own position, call it Humean or Aristotelian or whatever, simply denies that there is any particular realm of practical reason which is any less relativistic than any other. All practical propositions are hypothetical ones, insofar as their truth-values vary according to contingent psychological or physiological features of individual persons.
Seen this way, the burden of argumentation is clearly on the moral realist and on the Kantian. For the Humean simply affirms what each of us already accepts: (1) that practical reason is relativistic and (2) that what you have reason to do is conditioned by who and what you are. My opponents believe something stronger: that there is a special form of practical reasoning for which this does not obtain, for which practical reason suddenly (and mysteriously) becomes much more like its theoretical cousin. Arguments abound for both sides of this debate, but I think this is a good way of carving out the logical space.
13 comments:
I very much enjoyed this. It covers a lot of ground briefly and in an intuitive order. Kudos!
Excellent post. A few comments from a broadly Davidsonian perspective…
Re: believing vs. doing
people reason theoretically in order to decide what to believe, and that people reason practically in order to come to a decision about what to do.
I would think acquiring a belief is itself a form of behavior. So I don't think that's the right way to draw the distinction.
I think a better way of delineating the two would be to take into account the neutrality of pure theoretical reason: theoretical reasoning can tell us whether a conclusion follows from its premises, not whether we should adopt either the premises or the conclusion.
The imperative to actually accept either would have to come from practical reasoning. It would be in the form, "I ought to believe such-and-such."
Re: relativism
It doesn't seem to me that practical reasoning is relativistic in any special way. The truth of any proposition is relative to what the proposition is about, whether it's "I ought to help that person," or just "That apple is rotten."
So, the fact that "I ought to pursue Olympic weightlifting," is true for Alice but not for Bob seems fully explicable by noting that in fact two propositions are being evaluated here:
1. "Alice ought to pursue Olympic weightlifting."
2. "Bob ought to pursue Olympic weightlifting."
Now we can say that (1) will be true, and (2) false, for both Alice and Bob alike.
Re: moral realism etc.
I suppose I would count as a moral realist, since I don't draw a distinction between perception of physical properties and perception of moral properties.
On the other hand, I acknowledge that those properties are relative in the ordinary way of being about particular situations, subjects, objects, etc.
Thanks for that, shiningwaffle. Some commentary:
First, I can't really accept that belief-formation is behaviour, unless you're using the term "behaviour" so broadly as to include the behaviour of physical objects. Behaviour is something that we (at least often) have control over and are responsible for. Most of our foundational beliefs simply force themselves on us, and to the analogy breaks down in a prticularly important way.
Second, I think your Alice/Bob example is very useful because it does illustrate the kind of relativism I'm talking about. Practical truths are indeed non-relativistic in the sense that you delineate. It is not that I cannot make sense of another's proper courses of action just because I am not that person. You and I can come to well-founded agreement about each of us having good reason to take opposite courses of action.
However, a weaker kind of relativism simply involves this: what it is good or right or correct to do varies from individual to individual in a way that what it is good or right or correct to believe does not. Practical truths are hypothetical, theoretical truths are distinctly categorical. This is what is distinct about practical reason, and I still believe that the burden of argument is on the realist or Kantian constructivist to show why practical reason suddenly, in the case of morality, becomes non-relativistic (categorical).
It almost sounds like you're suggesting that there is a formulation of the categorical imperative that requires us all to become Olympic weightlifters. For starters this would of course violate the perfect duty against logical contradiction: If we were all Olympic weightlifters, Olympic weightlifting itself would become a logical impossibility (Who would make the protein shakes? Who would sew those cute onesies?)
Kant did not argue that all moral precepts are categorical, just that hypothetical imperatives should not supersede categorical ones. Fundamentally this is just an appeal to rationally consistent ethical behavior. I don't really see you mount an objection here to the idea that some principles should or must be universally applied to all rational agents. I think you would agree, for example, that an ethos should satisfy the basic requirement of being communicable.
On the other side of the ledger, theoretical reasoning is significantly contingent, relying on, in Kant's words, "the receptivity of the subject." (You can't meaningfully talk about Kant's moral philosophy without reference to his doctrine of transcendent idealism.)
For example, "There's a Cadillac in the living room" is hardly a purely objective statement fact. It's a selection of observations reliant upon social norms. Some observers might not find the terms "Cadillac" or even "room" to be meaningful and/or relevant. Some might merely dispute their meaning. (If we found no car, but determined that there was a descendent of Antoine Laumet de La Mothe, sieur de Cadillac, in the room, would the statement be less true?) Perhaps we can presume that a 12th century Inuit could be made to accede the truth of the statement once all the necessary contexts were explained to him, but this doesn't mean the fact is not still "relative" to those contexts. Nor does it mean this truth is "binding" on the tribesman, who will most likely go home and explain it (or not) in the terms most meaningful to him.
I admire your defense of relativism here (a very important principle, all too maligned), but I think your erection of a firewall against relativism within theoretical reasoning is no more legitimate than the one you suggest Kantians and moral realists erect within practical reasoning.
"The same practical course of action: “I ought to pursue weightlifting”, is true for Jim and false for me, and this is so because of contingent facts about each of us. There is nothing left to say."
There are at least two ways a non-relativist could defeat this example.
1. They could point out that the "I" here is doing tricky things, and that when translated appropriately the relativism drops away. There is nothing relativistic about saying "Nick should not pursue weightlifting" and "Jon should pursue weightlifting", just as there is no evidence for the truth of relativism by saying "Nick has brown hair" and "Jon has blonde hair".
2. Suppose you don't like 1) and you think that there really is a relativistic proposition here, something like "One should pursue weightlifting", which is true for Jon but false for Nick. The non-relativist could say that, in fact, this general form is true for neither; what is true is "One should pursue weightlifting iff you are relatively strong already and don't have a good job" or whatever, which is true for both and explains why Jon, but not Nick, should pursue weightlifting.
Jon,
I think my use of the term "relativism" may hve been unwise, as it conjures up some rather extreme doctrines. What I am referring to is this: the truthmakers for practical propositions are contingent features of individuals. This means that they are hypothetical, in Kant's terminology.
Now, the realist or the Kantian believes that there is a realm of practical reason which (somehow) does not display this feature, because there are (allegedly) some practical propositions which are necessarily true for all individuals, no matter what their contingent physiological or psychological properties. This is the main implication that the post was driving at.
Now, I am currently flirting with the position that first-personal indexicality is essential to genuinely practical propositions. That is to say, as soon as you remove the "I" from a proposition it is almost certainly becomes theoretical. When you ask yourself what other people have reason to do, you're reasoning theoretically about practical reason, but you're not reasoning practically.
If this can be defended, and I think it can, then these propositions are genuinely relativistic in an interesteing way, because the "I" is not (as you say) doing tricky things, rather, it is an essential part of any practical proposition.
Chris:
I must admit that I'm having a hard time understanding your critique. If you really are saying that Kant didn't think that moral imperatives are categorical, then I really don't know what else to say. That he did think so is as close to a completely accepted interpretive truth in philosophy as there is. For Kant, there is one moral imperative (in three versions), and it is categorical. All duties arise, directly or indirectly, from it.
Here's an objection that I think needs addressed, and one I find suitably undermining of your position. Though there are what we might call Type-facts that excuse you from weightlifting as a profession (having any reason whatsoever to pursue Olympic weightlifting) and obviously Jim doesn't have any musical inclination like you to have a reason to pursue music, there are still reasons common to both of you. Let me explain.
Type facts do not diminish the fact that there are forms of life, or patterns of social organization that mitigate our social interaction. Neither of you have reasons to pursue relative interests that are generated out of your talents, but your talents are entirely logically independent of the forms of life we live. We esteem the fair treatment of sexes in the work place or a hopeful just and fair distribution of goods in our society. These are not the type of the things that are open to the contingent chance of individual types. If both Jim and you apply for a job at Earls, Jim and you both desire fair treatment.
Thus, you can be a relativist about practical reason as it pertains to the cultivation of private desires that have little impact on the world, but when it comes to concern things greater than choice of profession, then you will encounter reasons that transcend at a minimum instances where various typed-individuals interact.
Nick,
I agree that Kant put forth that all moral duties arise from one, categorical, imperative. But in doing so he did not obviate the need for hypotheticals. Rather he argued that hypothetical imperatives were always contingent upon a given end or ends, and should therefore not be disconnected from categorical ones, which unified them in a consistent moral scheme.
Kant explicitly makes allowances for contingent moral choices by invoking the "imperfect duty," which is is reliant upon local, personal, or subjective circumstance.
To return to your weightlifting example, it would be absurd to suggest that everyone lift weights on an Olympic level. Not just absurd but logically impossible. Society could not be structured this way. The relevant question is whether, as a hypothetical imperative, electing to lift weights can be found to satisfy some categorical purpose. (Whether JIm, but not Nick, has an imperfect duty to lift weights at the Olympic level). If it can, then the fact that being a weightlifter is contingent upon a number of specific personal factors doesn't rule out universality from the entire sphere of practical reason. For example, we may argue that it is a universal good (or duty) to be happy and fulfilled, and therefore those well suited to weightlifting should pursue it.
To say that "we are all relativists in the practical sphere" is not the same as saying that we are only relativists in the practical sphere. In my earlier comment I asked you if you really thought that no universals pertained to moral thought (for example that it be intelligible or communicable). The very fact that you reject weightlifting as a career implies a larger moral imperative that one ought to do what one is suited for. This may not rise to the level of a universal (Kant didn't think so), but it at least points to a nestling hierarchy of imperatives. Kant intended to unify this hierarchy (Kingdom of Ends) on the basis of reason, which is essentially a tautology: moral reasoning should not be irrational.
That's the first prong of my critique, that the existence of relativistic reasoning in the practical sphere does not rule out the employment of universals (and as a corollary, in the absence of higher order (if not categorical) moral principles, it is unclear how we can orient our hypothetical moral choices.)
The second prong is that theoretical reasoning is not entirely absent of relativistic influences. All theoretical reasoning is conducted in language, which is normative and fluid.
I'm sympathetic with your stance against moral realism, (and to a lesser extent, against deontology), but I don't think the scheme you propose here is going to be fruitful if it tries to cleanse practical reasoning of all non-relativistic thought, and theoretical reasoning of the opposite.
Just realized after posting the last comment on "The Roots of Metaphysics" that I never got around to responding to your response on this one. Apologies.
You said: First, I can't really accept that belief-formation is behaviour, unless you're using the term "behaviour" so broadly as to include the behaviour of physical objects. Behaviour is something that we (at least often) have control over and are responsible for. Most of our foundational beliefs simply force themselves on us, and to the analogy breaks down in a prticularly important way.
I agree that most of our foundational beliefs are forced on us (they're "exogenous shocks," as Long puts it). But I don't think that nullifies my point, since we can still exhibit a lot of indirect control on what beliefs we acquire.
For one thing, I can exert a good deal of control over what shocks I get. I can choose to go into a room and acquire lots of new beliefs about it (e.g. it has blue carpeting, is about twice the size of my bedroom, has two leather recliners in it, etc.) or stay out and only acquire a few (e.g. the door is light brown and made of wood).
For deduced or induced beliefs, I can choose whether or not to expose myself to evidence and arguments for and against the beliefs (creationists stand out as a good example of this, insulating themselves from the evidence for evolution, but anybody can buy himself or herself a lot of denial this way).
And even once exposed, I can exert at least some control about what to do with the new information. I can reject it, suspend judgment about it, actively consider it, accept it wholeheartedly, etc.
So I still think the belief-behavior distinction doesn't hold generally.
Continued.
You wrote: However, a weaker kind of relativism simply involves this: what it is good or right or correct to do varies from individual to individual in a way that what it is good or right or correct to believe does not.
I can actually agree with that.
However, I'm sure you'll agree that what is good or right or correct to believe does vary from individual to individual, since two individuals will have different experiences, have been exposed to different ideas and arguments, and have different tacit knowledge and background assumptions.
It's just that what is right to do varies more, because the inputs are more varied and complex. Where my car is parked right now won't be affected by what I do tomorrow; whereas where I should and do park today will be affected by what I plan to do tomorrow.
Practical truths are hypothetical, theoretical truths are distinctly categorical.
Yes and no. This gets interesting for me, since on reflection I think I'm actually closer to your camp, and I was just using the term "moral realism" a bit differently than you do.
Basically, I agree that (to quote part II of this) "there is [no] particular realm of practical reason which is any less relativistic than any other." But on the other hand, I think that (a) different individuals will have more values, and thus practical imperatives, in common than not and (b) on the whole, moral imperatives vary less than other kinds.
Moreover, I think this is not just, but necessarily so, simply because no one's made good sense of the opposite situations:
1. Even the most despicable acts have at their core an identifiable value which we also share: pleasure, power, safety, justice, trying to do the right thing, etc.
2. Moral imperatives those we most insist others follow, so they will on the whole be those we share with the fewest exceptions. On the other hand, if we start noticing how commonly an imperative varies, we tend to stop calling it a moral issue (e.g. sexual orientation: I, as a heterosexual male, should court women but my gay friend Chuck should court men).
I call myself a moral realist simply because I think this form of relativism is still on the same level as "Bob is a horse" being true about some Bob's but not others, or "Snow is white" being true in English but meaningless in Greek.
Shiningwaffle:
Comment 1: Aren't the considerations you're citing simply evidence that there is no practical-theoretical dichotomy? I suppose I could not possibly be claiming this. However, there is still ample support for a practical-theoretical distinction, and a strong one at that.
Comment 2: I anticipated that someone might say "but morality isn't relative to persons, only their beliefs, desires, situations, socialization, etc..." If you think about it, there's a cartesian account of personal identity lurking in this idea. For i would claim that a person is (practically speaking ) identical with certain beliefs, desires and other "core" psychological features. Indeed, the rejection of Cartesianism seems to lead something like this. Yet, since morality is relative to precisely these kinds of features, then morality is relative to persons.
As for Moral Realism, y'know, I agere that this label is extremely tricky. I believe that ethics (based as it is on subjectivity and the kinds of shared values you point to) is as "real" as tables or chairs, but I still don't count as a moral realist. I also believe in categorical imperatives (i.e. imperatives that are generated for a subject by their deepest, most enduring convictions and cares), but because I don't believe in the Categorical Imperative, I don't count as a "constructivist" either. I sometimes feel as though these terms, which are, after all, "money" terms in philosophy, haven't been illegitimately hijacked.
Nick:
I think of the practical-theoretical dichotomy as resting on the fact that no one has found a way to conclude with an imperative without starting with one in the premises, at least implicitly. You can't get an "ought" from just any old "is."
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