Scenario A: you're in a lab, with a bunch of sensors attached to your skull. You're instructed to choose one of eight cards, you choose one. Afterwards, the scienctists tell you that they correctly predicted which card you would choose.
Scenario B: a speeding truck is heading right for you, and you jump out of the way. Afterwards, I say to you: "Hey, I knew you were going to jump out of the way."
Scenario C: I call you and tell you that I'd like to interview you for the prestigious position you applied for. I tell you that the interview is at 11 AM. The next day, you come into my office at 11 AM, and I say: "Ah. I predicted that you'd be here around 11."
Anyone see the problem, here? Why is prediction in the first case supposed to be more significant than in the second and third?
9 comments:
Thanks for this. There's a great deal about this I wish I had more time to comment on (at my poor neglected blog). Suffice it to say in the meanwhile how heinous it is that the conclusions being reached by these studies (by neuroscientists with little to no training in moral philosophy) are now being presented as evidence that human beings can't be held responsible for their actions. This shit alarms me way more than the Tea Party.
I too am of the opinion that "predictable" is not tantamount to "determined" (or non-culpable), but I think that anyone could correctly predict the outcome in B and C without any special equipment or knowledge (other than the information you mention). The concepts involved are basic to just about every human.
However, in A, the outcome is not so obvious. People would probably fail to accurately predict the outcome most of the time without the information which neuroscientists gather. That strikes me as a difference, even though it is not what you are driving at.
That special equipment can be used to track patterns of activity in the brain that lead to certain decisions is not that surprising. That accurate predictions can be made before the decider becomes aware of what he has decided is slightly surprising. However, it is only surprising because what was once thought to be private information is not. Neuroscientists can invade that pervious private space.
I wish the experiment were different. Because it pertains to decisions, and democratic/libertarian fervor is alive/well, the outcome can easily fool people. If the experiment were about say, pain ( someone could scan my nervous system while I touch a hot stove and know that I would feel pain before I actually felt it), no one would give a rip.
It is a good thing philosophers are around to mitigate the sometimes poor conclusions of scientists (admittedly, scientists sometimes help philosophers in this way too). Props to Al Mele for being continually discerning and impartial (and patient) though this unfortunate fad in neuroscience.
I'm curious as to the context under which you say that this result is only slightly surprising. As far as I can tell, to most people it is quite surprising, that is, to anyone with a strong assumption that decision making equates to the conscious experience of decision making, which, in Western culture anyway, is probably most people, I'm not sure why it might fail to be quite surprising.
Perhaps it is worth emphasizing that what is new here is not just that neuroscientists are gathering information that has previously been private, in the sense of accessible only to the individual making the decision, but that they are gathering information about the decision before that individual is even conscious of having made one.
I'm not saying it ought to be very surprising, I'm just wondering under what premises you think it isn't. It occurs to me that Nietzsche probably provides a framework in which this result might not seem out of place.
I guess I'd say the prediction in scenario A is more important than the other two because it tells us something we didn't know about the relationship between brain activity and consciousness. Why should it necessarily be the case that the neural activity indicating a decision which feels consciously made should precede the registering of that decision in consciousness? This is significant but doesn't strike me as having anything anything to say about free will and determinism. I'm mostly saying this because the question in your post struck me as so confusing when I first read it before you posted your comment.
Chris: In case you haven't seen it, Kahane and Shackel have a paper critiquing the use of moral philosophy language by neuroscientists working on the trolley stuff.
Hi Plover...
In the post, I didn't ask why scenario A was more suprising (surely it is, because of how little we know about the brain) but why it is more significant. Not to hijack the thread, but this is very important.
In short, if advance prediction undermines free will, then you coming to my office in scenario C is an unfree act. That's obviously wrong. What is it about neuroscientific prediction in particular that gives it significance for free will?
Sorry, my last comment was unclear.
In your comment, you said "That accurate predictions can be made before the decider becomes aware of what he has decided is slightly surprising." The first three paragraphs of my comment are in response to that.
Also, the sentence beginning "I'm mostly saying this..." was only intended to refer to the paragraph it appears in, not the whole comment.
I did understand that the original question was about significance. And I understand that advance prediction, in certain circumstances, could undermine an idea of free will. I was initially confused by your question because there are many different ways scenario A might be significant, and I didn't know which you meant. Since I don't, myself, think the sort of neuroscientific prediction in Libet type studies has much bearing on questions of free will, it did not occur to me that's what you were getting at. So at first, I thought you might be saying these results had no significance whatsoever, which seemed off the wall. While your first comment above made it clear that wasn't the case, I wanted to point out that your question might be misread.
Sorry, for making such a mess of things. Is my intent any clearer?
Hi Plover, that's actually a different "Nick" up there in the first comment. Ha. I can't speak for his concerns in the comment. Damn, I need a new username.
"In short, if advance prediction undermines free will, then you coming to my office in scenario C is an unfree act"
I think that clarifies the difference. In scenario C the prediction is based on the fact, which was known by both of you well before the prediction, that the subject wants the job. Such a prediction is, I think, compatible with most theories of free will, though it could be falsified if something came up which the subject regarded as more important than the interview. Scenario A is significantly less symmetrical - your prediction is based on facts that the subject does not know at the time you make it.
Hm... damn... even more of a mess than I thought... oookay...
My apologies, everyone.
Usually I notice the avatars.
Er, at least I'm not an indirect consequentialist...
*
To Ursiferous Nick:
Well, now I know why that first comment didn't seem to sound like you, why it seemed a strange response to Chris, and what you meant about derailing the thread.
So, starting over, I agree with Bearless Nick where he says:
in A, the outcome is not so obvious. People would probably fail to accurately predict the outcome most of the time without the information which neuroscientists gather. That strikes me as a difference, even though it is not what you are driving at.
As I see it, the results of these Libet type experiments are important because they show that the human self that has agency is not identical with the self of conscious experience. I don't see how they could answer anything about what way that agency is free or determined. The most they can do is suggest that willing might not be equivalent to the experience of willing. However, to show whether that suggestion bears out appears to require knowing what way processes that generate action that can be called willed are integrated with the processes that generate the conscious experience of willing.
Couple the preceding with the epistemological differences between your three examples, and the question in your post appears quite confusing. From many angles, the prediction in A is more significant than the others. (Sadly, this argument may now be contingent on whether I've proven myself the most easily confused thing on the internet.)
If, however -- as it now appears -- you intended "significance" to be considered strictly in the context of a free will/determinism debate, then I'm pretty sure I agree with your actual point.
I'm curious as to how you view the relationship between neuroscience and philosophy. To what extent do you think philosophers should pay attention to neuroscience? Do you think problems arise largely from overreaching statements like the one in the article you linked, or is there more to it?
*
To Bearless Nick:
I would still be interested to know what is behind your statement about the surprise value of the results cited in the article.
I don't see why the brain would bother to generate an illusion of free will. Couldn't any such reason also justify an illusion of ultraviolet?
I nominally agree with David Evans. In A and B, both subject and observer can predict the action, but in the C only observer can.
However, the experiment's details are important. They asked the subjects to push the buttons when they felt the urge.
I'd interpret that as, "When you feel a spontaneous impulse to press, press." Yes, of course you'll be able to predict my subconscious impulses as they form. But at this point I've repaired the objection; we agreed I'd not veto the impulse. While I won't know the impulse until it is presented to consciousness, and you can see it earlier, the point stands.
So it is an experiment about free will if an only if the subjects were significantly different from me, which means it doesn't generalize to me anyway.
Also highlights a very general problem with these kinds of experiments - I don't care which finger I use. In this case, that it is affected by processes seven seconds in advance just means even tiny perturbations are enough to change my mind. My consciousness is involved to the absolute minimum extent.
Post a Comment